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ABSTRACT
HYPERTEXT AND THE CRITICAL CONVERGENCE
Berat Çokal
M.RA. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Instr. Zafer Aracagök 
June, 2000
Today, within the information and telecommunication technologies, internet 
technologies occupies the dominant role. Hypertext is the system that 
underlies many of the main digital multimedia with its capacity to hold 
different media like text, image and sound together by linkage. Upon this 
linkage capability of hypertext, some theorists call for the turning of an 
age towards a new digital democracy, by employing ideas of contemporary 
critical theorists and philosophers. This thesis examines the points of 
oonvergence in their claims, criticizes the way that they employ 
philosophy. Consequently it is shown that how these claims of 
convergence between critical theory and hypertext, turn out to be the 
convergence between liberal democratic ideals and digital democracy.
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ÖZET
HİPERMETİN VE KRİTİK YAKLAŞMA
Berat Çokal 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Öğr. Gör. Zafer Aracagök 
Haziran, 2000
Günümüzde, enformasyon ve telekomünikasyon teknolojileri arasında 
internet teknolojileri baskın bir rol taşımaktadır. Hipermetin de, metin, imaj, 
ses arasında kurduğu fiziksel bağlarla birden fazla medyayı bir arada 
sunabilmesi sayesinde, bir çok ana digital multimedya teknolojisinin altında 
yatan sistem haline gelmiştir. Bir takım kuramcı da hipermetinin bu 
kapasitesi sayesinde dijital demokrasiye doğru bir açılımı işaret ettiğini 
söylemektedirler. Bunu yaparken bir çok çağdaş eleştirel kuramcıların ve 
felsefecilerin fikirlerini gündeme getirirler. Bu tez hipermetin kuramcılarının 
iddalarının, çağdaş düşünürlerin fikirlerine ne ölçüde yaklaşabileceğini 
sorgular. Temelde vurgulanan nokta ise sözedilen bu yaklaşmanın aslında 
liberal demokrasi idealleri ve digital ortamın önerdiği demokrasi anlayışı 
arasında olduğudur.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Hipermetin, Hipermedya, Teknoloji, Yapıbozum, Politika
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INTRODUCTION
We live in an age in which information and telecommunication 
technologies become an essential part of our lives. Amongst these 
online technologies, the internet occupies one of the dominant roles 
because of its multimedia capabilities, that is to bring together different 
mediums like text, image, and sound together in the same format of the 
digital. What underlies some of the main internet technologies, namely 
world wide web and ftp, is the system of hypertext that enables the 
bringing together in the same digital format. Hypertext achieves this 
very capability by the logic of linking certain parts of the documents to 
other texts, images or sounds, either internally or externally. When 
stored in the digital format these links become the choices for the 
reader/viewer where he selects his/her own path of reading/viewing 
the digital document.
However, concerning upon the same character of hypertext, i.e., linking, 
some theorists try to develop an understanding of hypertext. They, 
somehow, extend the definition of hypertext by employing the ideas of 
contemporary critical theorists, namely those of Barthes, Derrida and 
Foucault. They borrow the terms like 'intertextuality', 'web', 'network'.
non-linearity', etc. and Lse these terms to expand the borders of 
hypertext and claim a vast convergence between the ideas of 
contemporary critical theorists named above and hypertext. Hypertext, 
then, becomes the ground for the realization of their (critical theorists) 
ideas, or a laboratory to 'test' their concepts.
Consequently, upon these claims of convergence, hypertext theorist 
develop a positive understanding of hypertext, where this new 
technology will call for the liberation of human kind by altering the 
reader's or viewer's view of the multimedia hypertext through the links 
provided. Starting from the disappearance or the decrease in the 
authorly control in the construction of hypertext, the boundaries 
between author and reader will begin to blur, thus, with the 
universalization of hypertext systems all hierarchies will begin to blur 
forming a new kind of democracy which can be called as 'digital 
democracy'.
Thus, before any claim of convergence, I shall ask the question again: 
What is hypertext? Then I will continue to analyze how these theorists 
extend the definition of hypertext by considering hypertext as the 'new' 
text. We shall then see the attempts to embody contemporary critical 
theory. Then, in the second chapter I shall concentrate on the points of 
convergence and how these theorists employ Derridean concepts of
'intertextuality' and the 'text' and how hypertext becomes a ground for 
these theorists literally to 'test' tnese concepts.
In the last chapter I shall try to dismantle how these attempts to develop 
a new democracy through hypertext 'converge' with the idealism of 
liberal democracy through the arguments of Richard Rorty. The question 
is how one can develop a new understanding of democracy without being 
involved in today's condition of democracy but before this a question of 
hypertext again.
C hap te rl: HYPERTEXT CELEBRATED AS A NEW TECHOLOGY
1.1 What is hypertext?
Hypertext is a term that refers to a medium of electronic information 
that exists only on-line in a computer. Since many of the current 
systems actually also include the possibility of working with graphics and 
other media, some people prefer using the term hypermedia, to stress 
the multimedia aspects of their system.
What hypertext or hypermedia achieves is a step forward in electronic 
text. The computer offers a new medium for writing, which involves both 
the computer screen where text is displayed and the electronic memory 
in which it is stored. It is this digital coding that enable somehow 
flexibility in writing process. Electronic text brings an ease of editing 
with the use of text processor programs. Anyone can easily work on the 
presentation of a text by changing the page layout, font size and type, 
colors and etc. with the help of such kind of programs which provide us 
with a softcopy before the hardcopy. Softcopy offers a process-oriented 
rather than a product-oriented mode of writing. Softcopy documents are
written to be displayed rather than printed, and designed for provisional
recording in electronic storage, pending the rereading or rewriting of
thenn.
However, electronic writing that is not aimed at producing hardcopy 
brings with it another feature that forms the basic principle behind all 
hypertext systems. This is linkage. Once a text is written only for 
electronic display, computer technologies enable the linking of certain 
parts of these kinds of text to other parts.
A typical hypertext document would open with a top-level menu or home 
page which might include conventional texts, audio recordings, still 
pictures and/or video samples: indeed information of any kind which can 
be stored digitally. On selecting highlighted or colored words or phrases, 
or specially boxed graphic frames, a hypertext reader is led to a further 
screen containing more words and images which explain or expand the 
initially chosen item: and so on, potentially indefinitely. Each verbal or 
graphic point can be thought of as a node in a grid of nodes, such that 
the path traversed in any particular session of reading will be open to 
the interests discovered by the reader as she or he passes through the 
grid.
Here are some examples of hypermedia provided in an introductory 
document on world wide web, Guide to Cyberspace 6.1: What is 
hypertext and hypermedia?:
You are reading a text on the Hawaiian language. You select 
a Hawaiian phrase, then hear the phrase as spoken in the 
native tongue.
You are a law student studying the California Revised 
Statutes. By selecting a passage, you find precedents from a 
1920 Supreme Court ruling stored at Cornell. Cross- 
referenced hyperlinks allow you to view any one of 520 
related cases with audio annotations.
Looking at a company's floor plan, you are able to select an 
office by touching a room. The employee's name and picture 
appears with a list of their current projects.
You are a scientist doing work on the cooling of steel springs. 
By selecting text in a research paper, you are able to view a 
computer-generated movie of a cooling spring. By selecting a 
button you are able to receive a program which will perform 
thermodynamic calculations.
A student reading a digital version of an art magazine can 
select a work to print or display in full. Rotating movies of 
sculptures can be viewed. By interactively controlling the 
movie, the student can zoom in to see more detail.
These examples are mostly about the recently developed multimedia 
technologies that either appear online on www or digitally encoded on 
some storage disks such as CD-ROM's; the time when hypertext has 
already became the backbone for World Wide Web and CD-ROMs. But 
before all these, in 1960s Thedor H. Nelson first coined the term 
"hypertext" to refer to "nonsequential writing--text that branches and 
allows choices to the reader, best read at an interactive screen. As 
popularly conceived this is a series of text chunks connected by links 
which offer the reader different pathways" through stored visual, 
auditory, or written materials. The Macintosh HyperCard software 
program is a version of hypertext. HyperCard is structured by "cards," or 
screens of information, organized into "stacks," or categorized screens. 
Using a menu of commands, a user can flip successively through the 
cards of a stack, jump between cards in the same stack, or jump 
between cards from different stacks, all the while generating electronic 
links between jumps that are the "Ariadne's thread of the hypertext web" 
(Landow, 1992:4)
Along with the spread of personal computers Apple's hypercard became 
a useful system for categorizing information, thus, the backbone for 
W W W  and many other text-based digital media. But what is fundamental 
to hypertext, the ability to link certain parts of the digital documents to 
each other, has always remained at the center of attention. Today, the
World Wide Web and other Internet technologies, is the medium through 
which people can reach the same information provided and can share 
their ideas with their easy-to-publish character, namely desktop 
publishing. In this environment, by somehow over-emphasizing this 
fundamental characteristics of hypertext we are confronted with a so- 
called "hyper-literature" consisting of hyper-stories in which you pick-up 
your own adventure, hyper-poems from which you select your own 
verses, hyper-novels in which you set up your own characters.
Besides these attempts to create a hyper-literature, some theorists (or 
in Vicky Kirby's words "mavens") in English Literature departments in 
United States are trying to establish a hypertext theory. Richard 
Lanham the author of The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology 
and the Arts (1993), Jay David Bolter, author of Writing Space: The 
Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (1991), and George 
Landow, author of Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary 
Critical Theory and Technology (1992), the other primary exponents of 
the digital word of whose work I will address and further analyze to 
expose the theoretical substructure and assumptions which underlie 
their claims.
1,2 H ypertext as defined by hypertext theoris ts
1.2.1 Hypertext as the 'new' text
Hypertext as it is commonly defined is a means of organizing information 
in a 'nonlinear' fashion, consisting of chunks of text ("lexias") connected 
by links to other lexias in a networked manner. The term refers to both 
the system and its contents. Theorists began exploring hypertext from a 
literary perspective in the late 80's and early 90's, claiming that the 
interactive nature of hypertext invites us to reconfigure our conceptions 
of 'text', 'narrative' and 'author' fLandow & Delaney 2) in a fashion more 
suited to the nature of the medium. Hypertext shifts the responsibility of 
construction partly to the authors who write the links and partly to the 
readers who activate them. It also encourages connection across 
disciplinary boundaries, abandons print-based conceptions of fixed 
beginnings and endings and challenges narrative form based on linearity 
due to its dispersed, networked nature. Hypertext heralds a new form of 
writing: instead of the linear, passive narrative of the book and Codex 
Culture, we have the multilinear universe of the networked system.
Bolter, Landow, and Lanham equally praise the way in which 
the computer's ability to coordinate a reconciliation of 
divisive aesthetic and epistemological structures creates a 
synaesthesia of aesthetic effects or information bits. In fact.
all three writers aim to explain how, in Landow’s word, this 
synaesthesia promises "to produce effects on our culture, 
particularly on our literature, education, criticism, and 
scholarship, just as radical as those produced by Gutenberg's 
movable type. (Palatella par. 5)
They assume that there is a self-evident difference between hypertext 
and traditional print text. The very basic character of hypertext allowing 
for supposedly free choices to the reader has led communication 
theorists to think of hypertext as revolutionary, as distributing "power" 
away from the text producers to readers.
Definitions of hypertext are continually elaborated against a particular 
and rigid notion of print text. The definitions accorded to the text are 
also presumed to be the determinants of reading practices. Delaney and 
Landow, for example, elaborate their definition of hypertext against a 
notion of the traditional text, which they define according to three 
attributes: "that the text was linear, bounded and fixed". Their definition 
of hypertext is then able to become "the use of the computer to 
transcend the linear, bounded and fixed qualities of the traditional 
written text" (Delany and Landow 3). Their extended explanation 
proceeds negatively, contrasting hypertext with the static form of the 
book: accordingly, hypertext can apparently be composed and read non- 
sequentially as a variable structure comprising blocks of text connected
by electronic links.
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Landow has frequent references to the fluidity and instability of 
hypertext as opposed to the fixity of print-based text. This is premised 
on hypertext's electronic status, the fact that it is potentially able to be 
improved and added to by the reader, and so forth (Landow, 1992).
1.2.1 Bush's Memex and the Human Mind
Both Landow's and Bolter's cognitive theories link the conceptual origins 
of Nelson's hypertext back to the "memex," or mechanized memory, a 
device which Vannevar Bush, a MIT professor of engineering and 
wartime director of the U.S. Military Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, described in "As We May Think" in the Atlantic Monthly in 
1945. Armed with a military sense of mission. Bush grappled with the 
problem of mechanically organizing and making accessible the 
bewildering store of knowledge that modern science had created, 
especially during World War II. Bush proposed manufacturing the 
"memex," a desk-like device assembled from levers, screens, and 
motors, all designed to rapidly to search and retrieve information from 
microform records. This concatenation of gadgets ostensibly replicated 
the brain's processes of selection and association. As he describes it:
11
The human mind does not work [indexically]. It operates by 
association. With one item in its grasp, it snaps instantly to 
the next that is suggested by the association of thoughts, in 
accordance with some intricate web of trails carried by the 
cells of the brain. It has other characteristics, of course; 
trails that are not frequently followed are prone to fade, 
items are not fully permanent, memory is transitory. Yet the 
speed of action, the intricacy of trails, the detail of mental 
pictures, is awe-inspiring beyond all else in nature. (34)
Bolter and Landow consider Bush's description of the electro-mechanical 
memex to be a prescient description of hypertext, which they maintain 
reproduces the mind's tendency to think topographically; that is, like the 
mind (which for them is synonymous with the brain), hypertext stores 
and enables the establishment of a dense network of associations 
between memorized topics. Although Bolter and Landow don't trace the 
capacity of association to a particular hemisphere of the brain, as 
Lanham does, they nonetheless share with Lanham the belief that 
hypermedia can perfectly model cognitive processes embodied in the 
brain's neural network.
Bolter and Lanham maintain that certain ways of processing information 
are universal, based on the way the human brain functions, and this 
assumption enables them to reduce learning to certain basic cognitive 
operations, or heuristics, insisting that the best method for teaching and
12
acquiring those heuristics is through the development and use of 
programmed learning models.
Lanham proclaims that digital technology can perfectly shape human 
consciousness because it replicates the binary oscillation between the 
cognitive processes of the left brain and the right brain and between 
orality and literacy, between opaque and transparent forms of language, 
between playful and hierarchical semiotic patterns, between synthesis 
and analysis
1.3 Hypertext and the embodiment of Critical Theory
1.3.1 Embodiment of Critical Theory
The most basic, if not the most important, question to ask hypertext 
theorists is, whether they think that the links provided in the hypertext 
can ever exceed or even draw near to the capabilities of the human 
mind? Dyck in a way answers this question when talking about the 
convergence that hypertext theorists see between contemporary 
theorists and hypertext theory:
Contemporary theories of text as network center the 
networking activity in the mind of the reader. Hypertext, on 
the other hand, must largely rely upon the author to create a
13
web of links. Barthes theorizes an “ ideal text" in which a 
galaxy of signifiers is networked in an infinite number of 
ways. Hypertext obviously resembles this ideal text, but is it 
what Barthes had imagined? Intertextuality and the world of 
connections that we make as we read is not primarily a 
material reality, but an interior, reflective activity. Each 
reader produces an interior web, a galaxy of signifiers the 
complexity of which that individual is barely aware (or only 
ever partially aware). Landow's assumption that a material 
tool such as hypertext could adequately mirror the way an 
individual reads seems to have little respect for the reader’s 
mind. (Dyck par. 1)
In his argument, Dyck opposes the central claim among hypertext 
enthusiasts is that hypertext is 'readerly', as opposed to 'writerly', with 
this distinction based very loosely on that of Roland Barthes. Landow, 
Bolter, Lanham, Joyce and a handful of other hypertext theorists point 
out that the Barthesian Text, a text which writes itself across the 
interface between the body and the unconscious as a living network, 
"the blocks of signification of which reading grasps only the smooth 
surface, imperceptibly soldered by the movement of sentences" 
(Barthes, 13) is finally realized in the new medium.
At the beginning of his book Hypertext: The Convergence of 
Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology George Landow states 
that "critical theory promises to theorize hypertext and hypertext
promises to embody and thereby test aspects of theory, particularly
14
those concerning textuality, narrative, and the roles or functions of 
reader and writer” (3). Landow goes on to explain his understanding of 
the theories of Jacques Derrida and of Roland Barthes and to see their 
material presence in hypertext. Landow claims that an experience of 
reading hypertext or reading with hypertext greatly clarifies many of the 
most significant ideas of critical theory.
On the opening page of book Hyper/Text/Theory Landow describes 
hypertext as follows:
Hypertext, an information technology consisting of individual 
blocks of text, or lexias, and the electronic links that join 
them, has much in common with recent literary and critical 
theory. For example, like much recent work by 
poststructuralists, such as Roland Barthes and Jacques 
Derrida, hypertext reconceives conventional, long-held 
assumptions about authors and readers and the texts they 
write and read. Electronic linking, which provides one of the 
defining features of hypertext, also embodies Julia Kristeva's 
notions of intertextuality, Mikhail Bakthin's emphasis upon 
multivocality, Foucault's conceptions of networks of power, 
and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's ideas of rhizomatic, 
"nomad thought." The very idea of hypertextuality seems to 
have taken form at approximately the same time that 
poststructuralism developed, but their points of convergence 
have a closer relation than that of mere contingency, for both 
grow out of dissatisfaction with the related phenomena of the 
printed book and hierarchical thought. (1)
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Landow's discussion of hypertext invokes the standard 
Proper Names of the American hagiography of the 
poststructuralist avant-garde: Derrida, Foucault, Barthes,
Bakhtin, add Your (Favorite Theorist's) Name here. (Palatella 
par. 25)
According to Landow critical theory promises to theorize hypertext and 
hypertext promises to embody and thereby test aspects of theory, 
particularly those concerning textuality, narrative, and the roles of 
functions of reader and writer. Using hypertext, critical theories will 
have a new laboratory in addition to the conventional library of printed 
texts, in which to test their ideas. For him, hypertext greatly clarifies 
many of the most significant ideas of critical theory (1992:3). Hypertext 
has so much in common with such matters as Derrida's emphasis on 
'decentering' and Barthes' conception of the 'writerly' (which co-opts its 
readers as co-creators) that it constitutes "an almost embarrassingly 
literal embodiment" (Landow and Delenay 6).
Presenting his case a little differently. Bolter concludes that "hypertext 
is a vindication of postmodern literary theory" (1991:24). He points out 
that "the past two decades, postmodern theories have been talking 
about text in terms that are strikingly appropriate to hypertext":
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When Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish argue that the reader 
constitutes the text in the act of reading, they are describing 
hypertext. When the deconstructionists emphasize that a text 
is unlimited, that it expands to include its own interpretations 
- they are describing a hypertext, which grows with the 
addition of new links and elements. When Roland Barthes 
draws his famous distinction between the work and the text, 
he is giving a perfect characterization of the differences 
between writing in a printed book and writing by computer.
(ibid.)
Bolter finds it 'uncanny' that many of those postmodern pronouncements 
which scandalized print-bound readers seem no more than descriptive of 
the properties of computer generated hypertext. In many ways, suggests 
Bolter, hypertext confirms what deconstructionists and other 
contemporary theorists have been saying about the instability of the text 
and decreasing the authority of the author. "What is unnatural in print 
becomes natural in the electronic medium and will soon no longer need 
saying at all, because it can be shown" (143).
Like Bolter, Lanham also identifies an "extraordinary convergence 
between technological and theoretical pressures" (1993:279), which he 
would later call a "curious case of cultural convergence" (132). Lanham 
believes that Western culture, "for which 'the Great Books' has come to 
be a convenient shorthand phrase, is not threatened by the world of 
electronic text, but immensely strengthened and invigorated" (ibid.). He
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argues that "digitizing the arts requires a new criticism of them", and 
that "we have it already in the postmodern aesthetic. The fit is so close 
that one might call the personal computer the ultimate postmodern work 
of art" (108). He goes on to suggest that the electronic word, as pixeled 
upon a computer screen, replicate the logics of postmodern thought by 
"literalizing them in a truly uncanny way" (287).
Similarly Johnson-Eilola believes that hypertext helps us to "revise 
technologies of reading, writing, and literacy in key ways by making 
various traits of these theories visible" (1992:203). He explains that the 
text can be "deconstructed [not only] in the reader's mind or in a 
secondary, parasitical text, but also visibly on the computer screen" 
(382).
'Convergence', 'embodiment' and 'literalization' are metaphors commonly 
used by these writers to characterize the relationship between hypertext 
and contemporary literary theory. However, these claims of a 
convergence between contemporary critical theory and technology, 
specifically hypertext, is an over-rationalization on the technical 
definition of hypertext and appropriation of contemporary critical theory. 
The convergence of terms to which Landow points between these areas 
is simple appropriation -- the theoretical connections have not been 
established in any systematic way. Landow's thesis is that the non­
sequential, branching networks of hypertext produce the same kind of
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economy of reading and writing defined by the French literary and 
cultural theorists Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault.
Flence Landow writes:
From the vantage point of the current changes in information 
technology, Barthes's distinction between readerly and 
writerly texts appears to be essentially a distinction between 
text based on print technology and electronic hypertext, for 
hypertext fulfils [to quote Barthes (1974: 4)] 'the goal of 
literary work (or literature as work) [which] is to make the 
reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text. Our 
literature is characterized by the pitiless divorce which the 
literary institution maintains between the producer of the text 
and its user, between its owner and its customer, between its 
author and its reader. This reader is thereby plunged into a 
kind of idleness -- he is intransitive; he is, in short, serious: 
instead of functioning himself, instead of gaining access to 
the magic of the signifier, to the pleasure of writing, he is left 
with no more than the poor freedom to either accept or reject 
the text: reading is nothing more than a referendum. 
Opposite the writerly text, then, is its countervalue, its 
negative, reactive value: what can be read but not written: 
the readerly. We can call any readerly text a classic text'. 
(1992:5-6)
1.3.2 Hypertext and Barthes' 'readerly' and 'writerly'
Landow claims that Barthes' distinction of readerly and writerly is 
just the distinction between printed book and hypertext.
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respectively. For him, hypertext blurs the distinctions between 
reader and writer by allowing the reader to choose his own path of 
reading. Thus, hypertext provides a more democratic environment 
through the multi- or non-linear 'readerly' text.
Hypertextualism, in its opposition to the 'writerly', the 'monologic' and 
the 'linear' appears to think that, prior to the advent of hypertext, 
reading was a single process, something like the scanning of a printed 
book from the first to the last word, with information passing into 
cognition in a sequence dictated by an author, allowing no space of 
intervention to the reader. It is as if the page-bound* text was under the 
dictatorship of the author, whereas in hypertext, the author is no more a 
dictator but an usher.
According to McHoul and Roe in their reading of Roland Barthes, 
Landow makes a "terrible category mistake". "While Landow wants to 
make a complete separation between types of text such that the 
'writerly' type is conflated with print (and hence closure) and the 
'readerly' type with hypertext (and hence openness), Barthes himself is 
more equivocal. For Barthes, the writerly text denies the reader the 
pleasure of writing, to be sure. But this is precisely what forces the 
reader into a readerly position, into the space of 'what can be read but 
not written'. He consciously tropes on Nietzsche's idea of a slave ethics
20
in introducing the readerly itself: it arises from a denial of entry into 
writing; it is a 'negative, reactive value'. It conforms to the writerly, gives 
itself over to it, plays its game. It too works with the rule of 'what can be 
read but not written'. And that is precisely why it is 'classic'. Where 
Landow finds an idealist space of liberation, Barthes only marks the side 
of the slave who is dependent on the master." (Par. 11) Barthes uses 
this opposition of writerly and readerly to define each text or encounter 
with a given work, language or system by this difference. It may be 
suggested more generally that both the readerly and writerly connote in 
fact or in effect, situations, economies or acts of reading or writing, or, 
in Derrida's phrase, acts of literature and acts of reading, in Landow's 
American liberalism, the oppressive simply has to be named and 
overcome by a word of negation - 'readerly'. In Barthes, the apparent 
opposite always depends on what it opposes, plays its game, and finds 
ways of operating within the same rules. The readerly and the writerly 
are two prongs of a single forked instrument - an instrument which may 
be writing in general and, if so, it will always contain possibilities of 
violence, one way or the other. (Par. 11) "Reading is like soup or slime. 
We should not want to specify its essence according to any neat digital 
calculus: not that it has no soul as such - rather it has a multiplicity of 
souls and "any one of them could at some stage take over and guide the 
sequence in its own direction" (Staten, 103).
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In The Rhetoric of Hypermedia: Some Rules for Authors, George 
Landow lays out rules for a smoothly functioning, efficient, and friendly 
hypertext. He argues that it is not enough simply to make links, but that 
one requires a carefully thouglit-out rhetoric of linking. He identifies 
three main goals that the hypertext author should accomplish: to orient 
the reader with an efficient and pleasurable navigational system, to 
allow the reader to purposefully exit a given lexia by providing clear links 
out, and to guide the reader’s entrance into a new document. By 
implication, one can accomplish these goals by obeying the rules that 
Landow provides. Landow's central assumption, that the form of 
hypertext itself plays upon the content presented, seems widely held by 
theorists in the area. More specifically, he argues that the informing 
idea of hypermedia is that one proceeds in understanding any particular 
phenomena by relating it to other contexts.
1.4 H ypertextual S tructu re  Through A uthorly  Rules
Landow’s rules do address practical design concerns. The very attempt, 
however, to write 'rules' for 'authors' raises some deeper questions, 
however. For one, the often made claim by Landow and others that the 
reader of a hypertext becomes in significant ways 'writerly' must be 
examined in light of the fact that the reader can only participate with a 
hypertext to the extent that it has been well-authored. Has.the writer
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really lost control when s/he determines how much control to give the 
reader?
McKnight et al., in The Authoring of Hypertext Documents note that 
most writings on hypertext have focussed on reading, on what is 
presented to the reader, and generally on reader-based research 
strategies. Authoring becomes something which is always oriented to 
reading (a very narrow and specific notion of reading), so that many 
hypertext systems in actual use blur the distinction between author and 
reader, particularly in cases "where the 'reader' will add links to the 
document, customize and annotate it, thus making the distinction 
between the author and reader less clear" (140).
Yet McKnight et al. also attempt to re-establish the place of the author, 
and do so by putting into opposition the hypertext author against the 
author of the conventional book. The crucial point they make here is 
against the basics of hypertext enthusiasm whose short history has 
always privileged the reader, and the readerly. They say:
Once we have it in our hands, the whole of a book is 
accessible to us as readers. However, sat in front of an 
electronic read-only hypertext document we are at the mercy 
of the author since we will only be able to activate the links 
which the author has provided. (McKnight et al. 140)
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This argument contrasts with the celebration of hypertext as 
constituting the pioneer of the readers' liberation movement; for it 
conceives of reading practices as essentially determined by the 
structure of the text, implying a traditional relationship between author 
and reader, mediated by intentionality. With these assumptions about 
reading, it becomes possible to understand the provision of links in a 
document as choices for a hypertext reader, which don't otherwise exist. 
McKnight et al in fact conceive of the links in a document as a constraint 
on the reader in that such links specify a structured, organized and thus 
limited number of options.
So although it seems that a critical position towards improperly 
celebrating hypertext receives some backing from McKnight et al, it's 
also true that one can object to them when they analyze hypertextual 
readings (indeed any readings) in terms of a very narrow 
communications model involving authors' intentions set in place 
specifically to impart limited information to readers who thereby become 
victims of the text. What this position misses -- along with the 
celebrationist position -- is that quite 'ordinary' (including pre- 
hypertextual and hypertextual) forms of reading cognition can be quite 
fluid, artful, nodal and so on: there is nothing special about this and this 
is why there is nothing special about hypertext. Along with the 
celebrationists, McKnight et al seem to think that what is called 'reading'
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can only be one thing: a single practice with a set of fixed and 
identifiable criteria. 'Reading' has always taken a number of highly 
diverse forms, some of which just happen to be used in electronic 
formations.
I don't believe that George Landow (or anyone else) could 
adequately map his own readerly thoughts, never mind 
authoring a hypertext that could somehow account for the 
networking capacity of another person’s thoughts (see real 
readers). Just say that a reader could have every text, every 
movie, every sound recording available to a hypertext engine.
Could even that readers truly map out the networking 
capability of the human brain? When one reads, one makes 
connections to other books, to movies, to songs. But the 
more significant links are often to personal memories of 
people and places, to moments, to epiphanic sensations 
impossible to quantify. These mental "links," infinite, complex, 
and protean have only a superficial similarity at the most to 
hypertextual links, which are fixed, consciously constructed, 
and according to Martin Rosenberg, not complex. (Par. 9)
1.5 The Rigid Structure Underlying Hypertext
Rosenberg notes that much of the language (the tropes) used to 
describe and to theorize hypertext has its origins in physics. He then 
argues that this language is often used inaccurately, that many of the 
claims made about hypertext do not stand up to scrutiny. In particular.
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Rosenberg tackles the often-stated claim that hypertext liberates the 
user from the linearity of the conventional text. To pursue his argument, 
Rosenberg looks to the binary and opposed categories, the dynamic and 
the thermodynamic.
Martin Rosenberg argues that hypertext, though it seems to break into a 
new contingency, actually resides in a thoroughly geometrical space. He 
says that while hypertext theorists claim that hypertext literalizes the 
complexity and hence liberation of the thermodynamic, hypertext 
systems themselves are fundamentally dynamic, bound within a strict 
system of relationships that do not change. Hypertext forms closed 
geometrical systems in which the reader has complete control over 
directional choice. Every hypertextual act is reproducible, in effect, a 
hypertext system can be learned and understood thoroughly. Ironically, 
in this very quality of hypertext--the power of the reader which Landow 
claims as liberation--lies the boundedness of hypertext to deeply 
pervasive geometrical thought. In making his point, Rosenberg refers to 
Ilya Prigogine’s critique of physics, in particular, his articulation of two 
basic assumptions of physics. The first of these regards being. 
Accordingly, "the laws of nature are transcendent to nature and are 
reversible with respect to time. This means that time has no real 
existence with respect to physical laws . . ." (279). Thus the purpose of 
physics is to identify in simplest possible terms the laws of nature. The
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second, contrary assumption regards becoming. Here, time is irreducible 
and irreversible: that is, because it remains inconstant, the laws 
regarding its behavior cannot be simplified to simple, immutable laws" 
(283).
Just how much power does the reader of a hypertext have? Martin 
Rosenberg argues that the multilinearity of hypertext "explodefs] the 
relationship between writer and reader by making the role of the reader 
more participatory, even subversive" (273). J. David Bolter says that the 
"reader may well become the author's adversary, seeking to make the 
text over in a direction that the author did not anticipate . . . The 
computer therefore makes visible the contest between author and 
reader that in previous technologies has gone on out of sight, 'behind' 
the page" (154). Rosenberg would even have us call the user of a 
hypertext a "wreader." Is the difference one of degree or kind? Of 
substance or of perception? Bolter is careful to say that the contest 
itself is not new, but that our awareness of it is increased. But whose 
awareness? Will the expert reader read a hypertext more actively than 
s/he would a book? An encyclopedia is also "multilinear;" does one's 
reading of it make one a "wreader?"
What becomes apparent in the way hypertext practice is organized 
(because of its orientation to this narrow kind of informational reading).
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despite the claims, is that it is still based on conventional structures of 
writing and linearity (albeit with a more clearly defined, and also more 
clearly limited, multilinearity). The metaphorics of hypertext (and 
hypertextualism) are illustrative here. Shneiderman and Kearsley (6), for 
example, have a section on "hierarchies" in which the predominant 
metaphors are the "tree" (roots, branches and leaves) and of the 
"parent-child" (defined as superordinate and subordinate concepts). The 
definitions and descriptions they provide for these terminologies 
function as instructions for reading which organize reading cognition in 
terms of a series of metaphors connected to several of what are now 
fairly conventional discourses. These metaphors -- browsing, indexing, 
searching, maps, filters, tours, navigation, etc. -- constitute a 
conventional conceptual reading apparatus. While the implied function of 
this apparatus can be read as a bridge or transition between 'old' and 
'new' modes of reading practice (enabled by the rigid definition of print 
text and the reader's relation to it), it appears more as the overlaying of 
conventional reading practice on new technology. The technology may 
be new, but the approach to it and the relations to it are wholly 
conventional. "Hypertext has already been colonized by conventional 
reading practices -- how could it not be since, in a sense, it is thoroughly 
conventional -  and the colonizers don't seem to have noticed."(McHoul 
and Roe par. 24)
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As mentioned above the pro-hypertext position claims its object to be 
revolutionary by virtue of the supposedly non-linear way in which reading 
cognition takes place in such electronic environments. Hypertext, then, 
as the ultimate "nonlinear organization of information" (Schneiderman 
and Kearsley 158), appears to signal an historic shift: the end of the 
book, the end of linear writing and reading. In our experience, there is no 
doubt that hypertext documents do have some unique aspects: they 
speed up the rate of information retrieval and they do allow certain kinds 
of access to proceed at a pace which would previously have been 
thought impossible, or to require massive and painstaking archival 
research.
The reader's paradigmatic interest is displayed in the unique path which 
she or he takes through a potentially infinite number of such paths in an 
information web. But each path, as the computer links from node to 
node, is a purely linear movement. Then, once retrieved, the image, 
sound or screen-print may or may not be inspected linearly. However it 
is inspected, the means of its inspection, at this point, will be precisely 
as it would be under any quite ordinary conditions of reading.
Outside the hypertext environment, print can be inspected 
either sequentially or, say, globally: such as when one looks at 
a page for its typographical characteristics. Outside the 
hypertext environment, still images are routinely inspected in
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non-linear fashion: in fact it's very hard to know what a linear 
reading of a photograph co:jld be like -- except that we know 
that computer scanners can divide photographs into pixels and 
proceed to reproduce them in a left-to-right, top-to-bottom 
form. Again, it's the computer technology which is more linear 
than the human and quotidian method of inspection. Outside 
the hypertext environment: films and videos can be viewed in 
'real' time, sequentially from frame 1 to frame n -- but simple 
VCR equipment also allows them to be looked at in freeze 
frame, in reverse, shot by shot, scene by scene and so on.
Quite simply then, there is a very broad variety of processes, 
both inside and outside the hypertext environment, which can 
be called 'readings'. The celebration of the supposedly new 
'readerly', 'exchange-based', and 'non-linear' forms of reading 
which hypertext permits may, then, be premature. Moreover, it 
may be based on (in order to be opposed to) a far too narrow 
conception of what 'ordinary' reading is. Let us turn to this 
problem. (McHoul and Roe par. 28)
For example, the ways in which Landow and others describe the 
'revolutionary' forms of reading involved in hypertext scanning appear to 
us to be extremely close to the ways in which readers use reference 
works such as encyclopaedias. Hardly anyone (except perhaps a 
proofreader) would read such texts from start to finish. Instead a 
particular set of interests will lead a reader to an index, then to the 
selection of an item in print, then (perhaps) to a graphic, or to a cross- 
referenced item, back to the index, to a different source text and so on. 
Each item can be thought of as a node, if need be; and (again, if need
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be) the encyclopaedia and the internal and external texts to which it 
leads can be thought of as a web of such nodes.
But Landow insists that these nodes are the nodes of "representation of 
knowledge" where knowledge is distributed throughout a network. He 
claims that contemporary science and critical theory offer converging 
theories of human thought and the thought world based on the network 
paradigm (1992:26). Hence he writes:
The general importance of non- or antilinear thought appears 
in frequency and centrality with which Barthes and other critic 
employ the terms l i n k ,  n e t w o r k ,  w e b  and p a t h .  More than 
almost any other contemporary theory, Derrida uses the terms 
l i n k ,  w e b ,  n e t w o r k ,  m a t r i x  and i n t e r w e a v i n g ,  associated with 
hypertextuality: and Bakhtin similarly employs l i n k s  (Problems,
9, 25), l i n k a g e  (9), i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s  (19), and i n t e r w o v e n  
(72). (1992:25)
It is bizarre and superficial to claim that an important theoretical and 
practical convergence has taken place simply because a number of 
terms Clink', 'web', 'network', 'interwoven') happen to be used in both 
hypertext discourse and in Derridean theory. Derrida's work on writing, 
for example, concerns writing in general -- a general condition of 
undecidability preceding all particular signs, texts and communications -- 
and so hypertext as a form of writing must be implicated just as much as
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other forms of writing. No 'special relationship' between Derridean 
conceptions of writing and hypertext has been established despite the 
claims. "That could only happen if one -- wrongly -- thought of Derrida 
not as a philosopher interested in writing's general preconditions (which 
he is), but as a prophet of sematic anarchy and the reader's liberation 
movement (which he most certainly is not). And Derrida 
notwithstanding, any claimed relationship between hypertext and 
'reader-power' must be problematic, especially given the highly 
conventional and organized structuring of hypertext." (McHoul and Roe 
par. 8)
In the next chapter, I shall further analyze these claims of convergence 
between hypertext and Derridean concepts of 'writing', 'text' and 
'intertextuality'.
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Chapter 2: DERRIDA AND HYPERTEXT
2.1 Hypertext and Intertextuality
Landow has frequent references to Derrida in his book, apart from 
Barthes. He establishes many literal connections between Derrida's 
works Of Grammatology, Speech and Phenomena, Glas, Dissemination 
and Structure, Sing and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences 
and hypertext. He claims that among major critical theorists, Derrida 
stands out as the one who most realizes the importance of free-form 
information technology based upon digital, rather than analogue 
systems. He proposes that Derrida, more than any other major theorist, 
understands that electronic computing and other changes in media have 
eroded the power of the linear model and the book as related culturally 
dominant paradigms as he quotes Derrida in Of Grammatology "The end 
of linear writing, is indeed the end of the book...it is within the form of a 
book that the new writings - literary or theoretical - allow themselves to 
be, for better or worse, encased" (Convergence 29). For Landow Derrida 
is a theorist who seeks for a way out of linear, stable form of the book in 
order to reach a new, freer, richer form of the text, therefore, in a way 
searches for a new technology to break with the investiture of the book.
33
but he cannot find a way out. When he quotes Derrida again in 
describing deconstruction "[there also exists] the possibility of 
disengagement and citational graft which belongs to the structure of 
every mark, spoken and written, and which constitutes every mark in 
writing before and outside of every horizon of semiolinguistic 
communication...Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or 
written...can be cited, put between quotation marks," (Derrida cited in 
Landow 8) he claims that Derrida is searching blindly for a way to 
foreground his recognition of the way text operates in print medium. 
Derrida, as a thinker working with print, sees its shortcomings but:
...for all his brilliance cannot think outside this m e n t a l i t é .  
Derrida, the experience of hypertext shows, gropes toward a 
new kind of text: he describes it, he praises it but he can 
present it only in terms of the devices - here those of 
punctuation - associated with a particular kind of writing. 
(1992:9)
Similarly Bolter claims that in Of Gramatology, Derrida argues that non­
linear writing has been suppressed though never eradicated by linear 
writing. He says that, believing that modern experience could not be 
recorded adequately in linear forms, Derrida concluded that we would 
begin to write in new ways. In this, argues Bolter, "Derrida was 
prescient, but he could not know that electronic writing would be the
new writing to which he alluded" (116). Instead of Derrida's phrase "the
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end of linear writing is indeed the end of the book" (1976:86), suggests 
Bolter, "the new electronic medium [in the form of hypertext] redefines 
the book in a way that incorporates both linear and non-linear form" 
( 116).
From a Derridean emphasis on discontinuity, according to Landow, 
comes the conception of hypertext, which is a fundamentally intertextual 
system and has the capacity to emphasize intertextuality in a way that 
page-bound text in books cannot. "When one moves from physical to 
virtual text, and from print to hypertext, boundaries blur - the blurring 
that Derrida works so hard to achieve in his print publications - and one 
therefore no longer can rely upon conceptions or assumptions of inside 
and out." (Landow, 1992:43)
Landow claims that the most interesting thing about hypertext is not 
that it may fulfil certain claims of structuralist and poststructuralist 
criticism but that "it provides a rich means of testing them". It is 
possible to say that he misreads what he refers to, but he also goes on 
to tell that Derrida cannot be successful in his attempts to break with 
the investiture of the book because he also writes in the book form. 
Here, Landow is too blind to realize that none of Derrida's "words" call 
for a literal end of the book and for all his blindness he thinks that he 
has the right to criticize Derrida for not writing in hypertext. Landow
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says that he is unable to grasp why Derrida, (for him) who described 
dissemination as a description of hypertext, cannot think of writing Glas 
in hypertext but then he somehow acquits Derrida by quoting Miller:
G l a s  and the personal computer appeared more or less at the 
same time. Both work self-consciously and deliberately to 
make obsolete the traditional codex linear book and to replace 
it with the new multilinear multimedia hypertext that is rapidly 
becoming the characteristic mode of expression both in and in 
the study of cultural forms. The 'triumph of theory' in literary 
studies and their transformation by the digital revolution are 
aspects of the same sweeping change (1992:28).
For Landow, Derrida conceives of text as constituted by discreet units 
of reading which are separate yet bound together. According to Landow, 
in Glas Derrida acknowledges "that a new, freer, richer form of the text, 
one truer to our potential experience, perhaps to our actual if 
unrecognized experience, depends on discreet reading units" (1992:8). In 
the case of every mark spoken and written, Derrida sees a possibility of 
disengagement. Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, can be cited, put 
between quotation marks. The implication of such separability is that 
here, as in hypertext, every reading unit "can break with every given 
context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is 
illimitable" (1988:185). Thus, Landow establishes the relation between 
Glas and hypertext, in the way that they both work deliberately to make
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obsolete the linear convention of printed books and to replace them with 
the more complex, networked, multi-linear and multimedia hypertext.
Similarly Bolter says that in Glas Derrida "lays down a textual space and 
challenges his reader to find a path through it... Whatever else he is 
doing, Derrida is certainly writing topographically, as if for a medium as 
fluent as the electronic" (116).
Another claim by Landow is that hypertext creates 'an open, open- 
bordered text, a text that can not shut out other texts'. This open text, 
Landow argues, embodies the Derridean text, which blurs "all those 
boundaries that form the running border of what used to be called a 
text, of what we once thought this word could identify, i.e., the 
supposed end and beginning of a work, the unity of a corpus, the title, 
the margins, the signatures, the referential realm outside the frame, and 
so forth" (Derrida cited in Landow, 1992:127). Indeed, according to 
Bolter too, Derrida's characterization of a text sounds very much like 
"text in electronic writing space" (162). For him, when Derrida speaks of 
marginality, or of the text as extending beyond its borders, "he is in fact 
appealing to the earlier technologies of writing, to medieval codices and 
printed books" (ibid.). Like other contemporary theorists, Derrida sets 
out to reverse a literary hierarchy while assuming the technology of 
printing that generates or enforces that hierarchy. Bolter asks, if the
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margins that concern Derrida are the borders of the printed or written 
page, what he would say about the electronic text. In hypertext, argues 
Bolter, the only margins and the boundaries are the 'the ultimate 
limitations of the machine'. Hypertext supports a network in which all the 
constituent elements have such equal status that 'to be at the margin 
itself is only provisional:
The author can extend and ramify this textual network limited 
only by the available memory". The reader can follow paths 
through the space in any direction, limited only by constraints 
established by the author. No path through the space need be 
stigmatized as marginal (ibid.).
Hypertext can be used to electronically link all the allusions and 
references in a text, both external and internal. This capability, both for 
Landow and Bolter, in hypertext systems, links within and without the 
text, that is intratextual (internal) and intertextual (external) connections 
between points of texts, become equivalent thus bringing texts closer 
together and blurring the boundaries through them. Bolter claims that 
the printed book encourages one to think of the text as an organic 
whole, a unity of meaning independent of all other texts. Hypertext 
however gives us a unique opportunity to visualize intertextuality:
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Stressing connections rather than textual independence, the 
electronic space rewrites the possibilities of reference and 
allusion. Not only can one passage in an electronic text refer 
to another, but the text can bend so that any two passages 
touch, displaying themselves contiguously to the reader. Not 
only can one text allude to another, but the one text can 
penetrate the other and become a visual intertext before the 
readers eye. (163-4)
The space of hypertext, for Landow, is a fundannentally intertextual 
system with the capacity to explore intertextuality in ways that page- 
bound text in books can not match. Although print can be made to 
display intertextuality, it does not encourage it, because the books' 
existence as bound object serves to separate its constituent pages from 
those in other books. The ease with which a conventionally parenthetical 
citation can be become a hypertext link to a completely different text 
"promotes an intertextual conceptual space" (Johnson-Eilola 112).
Landow says that another far-reaching feature of hypertext's 
intratextuality is its capability to hold verbal and nonverbal information 
together in the same environs. Hypertext, in Landow's words, 
implements Derrida's call for the inclusion of visual elements in writing 
as a means of escaping the constraints of linearity. Derrida, who asks 
for a new pictographic writing as a way out of logocentricism, has to a 
large extent had his requests answered in hypertext because:
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Hypertext systems link passages of verbal text with images as 
easily as they link two or more passages of text, hypertext 
includes hypermedia. Moreover, since computing digitizes both 
alphanumeric symbols and images, electronic text in theory 
easily integrates the two. In practice, popular word-processing 
programs, such as Microsoft Word, have increasingly featured 
the capacity to include graphic material in text documents.
Linking, which permits an author to send the reader to an 
image from many different portions of the text, makes such 
integration of visual and verbal information easier. (1992:43- 
44)
So it happens to be anyone who has Microsoft Word installed on his 
personal computer can include images in his text with links, write in 
hypertext format, therefore can write in the way that Derrida proposes, 
if there exist such a way.
Opposing to all these claims of convergence Grusin, on the other hand, 
attacks the embodiment argument as a pointless exercise, in so far as 
literary theories like poststructuralism, postmodernism and 
deconstruction do not need to be instantiated or embodied in new 
electronic technologies. The force of the Derridean critic is "to 
demonstrate the way in which thought and speech are always already 
forms of writing: For Derrida, writing is always a technology and already 
electronic" (475). Grusin believes that Barthes' distinctions between
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'work' and 'text' or between the 'readerly' and 'writerly' texts - both of 
which are "habitually cited as theoretical anticipations of the technology 
of electronic writing" (ibid.) - have been similarly misread. For Barthes 
as for Derrida, "the 'writerly' text is always already immaterial, allusive 
and intertextual - even in print". As Grusin goes on to argue.
This is not to deny that electronic writing the 'work' has taken 
a different form, one that seems more closely to resemble the 
Barthesian 'text'. But in describing hypertext or electronic 
writing as embodying the assumptions of Barthesian 
poststructuralism or Derridean deconstruction, electronic 
enthusiasts run the risk of fetishising the 'work', of mistaking 
the 'work' for the 'text', the physical manifestation (electronic 
technologies) for the linguistic or discursive text... The force 
of deconstructive and poststructuralist critiques is to ilústrate 
the way in which this destabilization is true of all writing. To 
think otherwise is not to instantiate or embody this criticiques 
but to mistake or ignore them (470)
We have so far illustrated that this procedure of literal parallelism is
incapable of following and discussing the concepts that are posed by
Derrida in the procedure of writing, which involves tracing and
difference. However, unlike Grusin, I do not want to continue on a
discussion to ensure the relative concepts that introduces Derrida in the
realm of hypertext, rather I shall count upon the contingency of an
encounter with that which forces one to rethink these concepts before
they have been pragmatized with the liberal thought that surrounds
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them. It's better to question these themes of a reduction, a 
uniformization of diversity, and an equalization of an inequality stitched 
together in a strange alliance between liberalism, hypertext and very 
Derridean concepts concerning the discussions of the recent computer 
technologies. However, this is not a question of alliance rather it is a 
break between Derrida and the former that should be followed. If it is 
not an alliance it is also not a contradiction that we need to point out; 
rather we have to concentrate on the irrelevancy of such discussions. 
The more contradiction arrived, the more the values peculiar to Derrida 
in contemporary philosophy disappears. It would be to fall into the same 
mistake with hypertext theorists, if one would try to point out every 
claim of convergence and to follow each with an explanation of 
Derridean concepts. Instead I shall concentrate on Derrida's concepts in 
Of Grammatology again, free from any hypertextual claim.
2.1 Derrida and his Concept of 'Writing'
Landow cites Derrida in his book Hypertext and the Critical 
Convergence:
The end of linear writing is indeed the end of the book, it is 
within the form of a book that the new writing - literary or 
theoretical - allow themselves to be, for better or worse, 
encased (1976:86).
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The concept of 'linear writing' and the 'book' that Derrida mentions here, 
is not literally writing in linear format or the physical presence of the 
book. This sentence occurs in the chapter Grammatology as Positive 
Science and in this chapter Derrida has nothing to do with the physical 
presence of the book. The concept of "non-linearity" mentioned here, as 
Derrida says in the former paragraph, is 'Saussure's linearist concept', 
more openly the linear relation between the signifier and the signified. 
Derrida says that the "line" represents only a particular model and "this 
model has become a model and, as a model, it remains inaccessible." 
Here this "enigmatic model of the line" is indeed the model or has 
become the model that philosophy does not realize even when it 
analyzes its own history deeply. " That's why beginning to write without 
the line, one begins also to reread past writing according to a different 
organization of space". In order to understand more clearly one must 
concentrate on the Derridean concepts of 'writing', 'textuality', 'non­
linearity' and the 'end of the book', and how he deconstructs Saussure's 
linearist concept, thus I will refer to the opening chapter of Of 
Grammatology to comprehend what this different is organization of 
space that Derrida seeks by deconstruction. Landow cites an important 
sentence from this chapter:
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All appearances to the contrary, this death of the book 
undoubtfully announces (and in a certain sense always has 
announced) nothing but a death of speech (of a s o - c a l l e d  full 
speech) and a new mutation in the history of writing, in 
history as writing. (1976:8)
Against any misunderstandings Derrida continues:
'Death of the speech' is of course a metaphor here: before 
we speak of disappearance, we must think of a new 
situation, of its subordination within a structure of which 
it will no longer be the archoh (1976:8).
By declaring 'the end of the book' and then 'the end of the speech', 
Derrida problematizes the treatment of writing in philosophy (Western 
metaphysics) as a means of expression which is at its best irrelevant to 
the thought it expresses and at worst a barrier to that thought. 
"Philosophy defines itself as what transcends writing, and by identifying 
certain aspects of the functioning of language with writing, tries to rid 
itself of problems by setting writing aside as simply an artificial 
substitute for speech." (Culler 92) It is important to figure out this 
condemnation of writing because "the phonocentrism that treats writing 
as a representation of speech and puts speech in a direct and natural 
relationship with meaning is inextricably associated with the 
logocentrism of metaphysics, the orientation of philosophy toward an
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order of meaning - thought, truth, reason, logic, the Word - conceived as 
existing in itself, as foundation." (Culler 92) Logocentrism situates 
writing in a secondary and derivative state, as a representation of 
speech, where speech is seen as natural and direct communication. 
Writing thus seems to be not merely a technical device for representing 
speech but a distortion of speech, a technical device or external 
accessory that need not to be taken into consideration when studying 
language (Culler 100). Thus, Derrida deconstructs this writing and 
speech hierarchy through Sausure's formulation of signifier and signified 
which are also set through a linear relation, an oppositional hierarchy.
Saussure defines language as a system of signs. He argues that signs 
are arbitrary and conventional and that each is defined not by essential 
properties but by the differences that distinguish it from other signs. A 
language is thus conceived as a system of differences. Structuralism 
and semiotics develop the distinctions between a language a language 
as a system of differences (langue) and the speech events which the 
system makes possible (parole)·, between the two constituents of the 
sign, signifier and signified. Acts of signification depend on differences 
such as the contrast between "tree" and "not-tree" that allows tree to be 
signified, or difference between signifying elements that allows a 
sequence to function as a signifier. The sound sequence 'bat' is a 
signifier because it contrasts with pat, mat, bad, bet, etc. "However if
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one tries to ground an account of meaning on difference, one fares no 
better, for differences are never given as such and are always products. 
A scrupulous theory must shift back and forth between these 
perspectives, of event and structure or parole and langue, which never 
lead to a synthesis. Each perspective shows the error of the other in an 
irresolvable aporia." (Culler 96) Derrida shows that signifiers are not 
necessarily connected to their signifieds; that there is no one to one 
correspondence between them by exposing how Saussure's formulation 
deconstructs itself.
We can extend to the system of signs in general what 
Saussure says about language: "The linguistic system 
( l a n g u e )  is necessary for speech events ( p a r o l e )  to be 
intelligible and produce their effects, but the latter are 
necessary for the system to establish itself. ... " There is a 
circle here, for if one distinguishes rigorously l a n g u e  and 
p a r o l e ,  code and message, schema and usage, et. And if one 
is to do justice to the two principles here enunciated, one 
does not know where to begin and how something can in 
general begin, be it l a n g u e  and p a r o l e .  One must therefore 
recognize, prior to any dissociation of l a n g u e  and p a r o l e ,  
code and message, and what goes with it, a systematic 
production of differences, the p r o d u c t i o n  of a system of 
differences - a differance among whose effects one might 
later, by abstraction and for specific reasons, distinguish a 
linguistics of l a n g u e  from a linguistics of p a r o l e .  ( 1 9 7 2 : 3 9 -  
40)
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Derrida introduces here the term différance which "alludes to this 
undecidable, nonsynthetic alternation between the perspectives of 
structure and event." (Culler 97) By employing the word différance 
Derrida plays with French language, to challenge the oppositional 
hierarchy between speech and writing. Différance sounds (exactly) the 
same as différence but ending with -ance, which is used in French to 
produce verbal nouns. By changing only a letter in a word, namely the 
letter a, which change cannot be heard in spoken language, Derrida 
challenges the traditional logic based on phonocentrism. Différance thus 
designates both a passive difference already in place as the condition of 
signification and act of differing which produces differences. Différance, 
as he writes:
"is a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on 
the basis of the opposition presence/absence. D i f f e r a n c e  is 
the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, 
of the spacing by which elements relate to one another. This 
spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive 
(the a of differance indicates this indecision as regards 
activity and passivity, that cannot yet be governed and 
organized by that opposition), of intervals without which the 
"full" terms could not signify, could not function." (1972:38- 
39)
From these concepts of spacing, asignification and differance Derrida
produces a new concept of writing. Derrida asks how one can illustrate a
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purely differential unit if all the identities are relational. If speech is put 
forward as an absolutely pure, transparent form of representation, it 
must be possible for me to repeat to a third party what someone said 
because a sequence of sounds can function as a signifier only if it is 
repeatable, if it can be recognized as the "same" in different 
circumstances. "A speech is not a sign sequence unless it can be quoted 
and put into circulation among those who have no knowledge of the 
"original" speaker and his signifying intentions... This possibility of being 
repeated and functioning without respect to a particular signifying 
intention is a condition of linguistic signs in general, not just of writing" 
(Culler 102). Writing can be thought as a supplement to or a 
representation of speech but as Derrida notes, "if 'writing' means 
inscription and especially the durable instituting of signs (and this is the 
only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), then writing in general 
covers the entire domain of linguistic signs." (1976:65) Thus writing in 
general becomes the condition of both speech and writing. Moreover, 
everything, including speech, in language operates on Derrida's 
generalized concept of writing; to put it in other words, there is nothing 
outside the text. Once writing is put forward as "a machine operating in 
and through every mark, utterance and thought, always producing an 
excess (therefore a loss) of signifying potential that cannot be boxed 
into the linguistic model of the sign" (Dienst 131), textuality in a 
Derridean sense involves not only the relation of speech and writing in
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philosophical discourse but also the "metaphysics of presence" in search 
for a foundation, an absolute truth. Logocentricism, in all its 
philosophical attempts, tries to describe "what is fundamental and has 
been treated as a centering, grounding force or principle. In oppositions 
such as meaning/form, soul/body, intuition/expression.
literal/metaphorical. nature/culture. intelligible/sensible.
positive/negative, transcendental/empirical, serious/nonserious, 
positive/negative, the superior term belongs to the logos and is a higher 
presence: the inferior term marks a fall. Logocentrism thus assumes the 
priority of the first term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a 
complication, a negation, a manifestation, or a disruption of the first." 
(Culler 93) Deconstruction thus becomes the philosophical strategy to 
dismantle these hierarchical oppositions.
In traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful 
coexistence of facing terms but a violent hierarchy. One of the 
terms dominates the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), 
occupies the commanding position. To deconstruct the 
opposition is above all, at a particular moment, to reverse the 
hierarchy. (1972:56-57)
But Derrida's mention of the reversal should not lead us to think that 
deconstruction is a reversal of hierarchies which would keep the 
hierarchy. Reversal may be called as an initial step in deconstruction, a
step where one problematizes the dominance of one term over the other.
49
What Derrida does is a kind of reversal when claiming that writing is a 
condition of speech, but he does not stop here and continues to "create" 
a generalized notion of writing which can then be called textuality. He 
demonstrates that this external differance of speech according to 
writing is at the same time an internal one, which makes speech always 
already a mode of writing. Thus Derrida's concept of deconstruction 
does not merely oppose or reverse the hierarchy rather it builds itself 
through it, in it; constitutes itself on the very existence of binaries. An 
opposition that is deconstructed is not destroyed or abandoned but 
reinscribed. Thus deconstruction works as a double operation, a double 
which does not simply have opposition hierarchical other. It divides the 
singularities into two, then again which then become a multiplicity 
requiring a fundamental shift in our textual ontology, a way from the 
"text itself" toward a conception of the textual system as an illimitable 
matrix crossing at variable speeds through all cultural, political and 
social dimensions (Dienst 137). Thus, deconstruction is to read in terms 
of diff6rance, which is "to delimit a formation of value by continuous 
passage through it, out to its aporias, its limits" (Dienst 133).
2.3 Hypertext as applied deconstruction
Having briefly reviewed Derridean concepts of writing, diffSrance and 
textuality therefore of deconstruction one would object to Landow's
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claims that there is a convergence between hypertext and the 
contemporary critical studies, to be specific between hypertext and 
Derridean concepts, in terms of two main difficulties in Landow's claim 
of convergence: misreading and application (or appropriation).
First, misreading in the sense that Derridean concept is not literally 
the act of writing as Landow employs it; rather it is a metaphor that 
Derrida uses in developing the strategies of deconstruction. 
"Writing refers to the notion of textuality which Derrida employs in 
his critique of philosophy and of other essentializing theories to 
emphasize that discourse, meaning, and reading are historical 
through and through, produced in processes of contextualization, 
decontextualization, and recontextualization" (Culler 128).
Second, the so-called achievement of hypertext, which is described by 
Landow as the blurring of the boundaries between reader and writer is 
not something that deconstruction proposes. What is proposed by 
deconstructionist strategies is not simply a blurring between the two 
ends of binary oppositions. Landow and the other hypertext theorists 
are trying to derive methods, techniques or procedures out of 
deconstruction in other words they are trying to 'test' deconstruction. 
Thus, a blurring of boundaries is a desperate attempt to "unite what they 
[it] separate [s] but only in its separatedness" (Debord, 54). Hypertext
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as a form of writing in itself and as a form of writing in Derridean sense 
is always already hypertextual long before it is said to be hypertextual.
Richard Rorty draws our attention to these attempts of "applied 
deconstruction" in United States. For him there are two dubious Derrida 
readings:
Derrida is read, by conservative know-nothings in the United 
States and Britain, as a frivolous and cynical despiser of 
common sense and traditional democratic values. Many of my 
colleagues in the Anglophone philosophical community 
support this reading, and attempt to excommunicate Derrida 
from the philosophical tradition.
Derrida is read by his fans in American departments of 
literature, on the other hand, as the philosopher who has 
transformed our notions of language and the self. They think 
of him as having demonstrated the truth of certain important 
propositions, propositions the recognition of which 
undermines our traditional ways of understanding ourselves, 
and understanding the books as we read. They also take him 
to have given us a method - the deconstructive method - of 
reading texts: a method which helps us to see what texts are 
really about, what is really going in them. (13)
In opposing philosophies of representation and construction, 
deconstruction resists any positive truth built into critical systems and 
becomes an anti-methodical method. It works as a system of differences
with no positive terms; the elements of the "system" are multivocal,
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undecidable, indeterminate, differential and such a system replaced the 
tradition of the metaphysics of identity with a new "tradition" of 
differences. Thus thinking of deconstruction as providing new, improved 
tools for unmasking books and authors - showing what is really going on 
behind a false front is, a simple application of deconstruction of which 
deconstruction resists. Deconstruction is not a method, which one can 
apply to text. Applied deconstruction means standing outside what you 
"deconstruct", in order to analyze it, understand it or perhaps cure it. 
Applying methods or techniques to better understand any text is to be 
drawn back into the logocentric circle and placed into neat categories in 
that circle. One must remember that deconstruction does not free itself 
from what it deconstructs, from metaphysics it contests, since it uses its 
metaphors and concepts. There is no "outside" beyond the metaphysics 
of presence. Metaphysics or logocentricism holds within itself, however, 
the resources for deconstruction. Deconstruction is not a denial, but the 
drawing out of inconsistencies, contradictions, of "differences" within the 
text. Derrida showed that the simple rejection of philosophies falling 
within the tradition of the metaphysics of presence is a fall into that 
which we seek to avoid, finally, because all texts can be read in 
ambiguous ways, first advocating presence, second, as deconstructing 
presence.
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Kathleen M. Wheeler draws our attention to the fact that Derrida's own 
essays act quite openly as a ribald parody of such critical writing which 
implicitly claim to have advanced beyond conventional, traditional 
criticism, yet actually remains rather firmly within its limited idioms.
A borrowing of Derrida's "ideas", or his methods and 
approaches, which merely applies and reiterates them within 
the limits of ordinary critical discourse and practice, is an 
example of the inevitable process of "taming" Derrida's wild 
originality - that Derridean deconstruction - a taming which, 
admittedly, many critics have deplored. (Wheeler 216)
Now it is quite clear that Landow's claim that hypertext provides a 
ground to test Derridean principles is problematic both in the sense that 
deconstruction resists testing or application and Derrida cannot be said 
to provide new principles. In the next chapter I shall tray to analyze how 
these hypertext theorists try to employ the ideas of critical theorists, 
namely of Barthes and Derrida, in order to develop a liberal democratic 
utopia through hypertext.
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As I have discussed in the previous chapters hypertext theorists claim a 
vast convergence between hypertext and contemporary critical theory. 
However, this claim becomes more problematic when they continue to 
develop a fantasy of digital democracy out of this convergence. 
Enforcing their argument with Bathes’ and Derrida’s ideas, they call for 
the turning of an age, where the new age will be the ground for blurring 
of hierarchies.
3.1 Hypertext and Democracy
C hapter 3: D ig ita l democracy in the United S tates
Since hypertext is said to have altered a reader’s or viewer’s 
relationship to print and visual language in a way that readers have more 
control over the text they read with the choices hypertext provides, 
hierarchies will begin to disappear beginning from the author/reader 
relationship. A reader’s becoming author will then result in the blurring 
of boundaries in every field and the intertextual nature of hypertext will 
not allow any ruling center. This hypertextual dissolution of centrality, 
moving the boundary of power away from the author in the direction of 
the reader, makes hypertext a model of a society of conversations in
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which no one conversation, no one discipline or ideology, dominates or 
founds the other (Landow, 1992:70). Hence Landow writes:
One sign of disappearance of boundaries between author and 
reader consists in its being the reader, not the author, who 
largely determines how the reader moves through the 
system, for the reader can determine the order and principle 
of investigation. Hypertext has the potential, thus far only 
partially realized, to be a democratic or multicentered system 
in yet another way: as readers contribute their comments and 
individual documents, the sharp division between author and 
reader that characterizes page-bound text begins to blur and 
threatens to varnish, with several interesting implications: 
first by contributing to the system, users accept some 
responsibility for materials anyone can read; and second, 
students thus establish a community of learning, 
demonstrating to themselves that a large part of any 
investigation rests on the work of others. (1 992:1 78-9)
Therefore one reads in Landow’s claim that the only obstruction before 
the new age of a more democratic world is that we have not, yet, 
digitized all fields of art, culture and education. Similarly, David Bolter 
confidently concludes Writing Space with an utopian claim: hypertext 
epitomizes how "an extremely powerful leveling force is at work in our 
society."
Our culture is itself a vast writing space, a complex of 
symbolic structures. Just as we write our minds, we can say
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that we write the culture in which we live. And just as our 
culture is moving from the printed book to the computer, it is 
also in the final stages of the transition from a hierarchical 
social order to what we might call a 'network culture.' For 
decades all forms of hierarchy have been disintegrating, as 
greater and greater freedom of action is granted to the 
individual. (32)
Bolter establishes an analogy betweein digital technology and democracy 
and notes that the transformation of social hierarchies into egalitarian 
networks accords with the benevolent goals and forces of liberal 
democracy. We are confronted v>/ith the same ideals in Lanham arguing 
that the digitization of arts (literature, music, art) radically democratizes 
them in two related ways. First, translating different artistic techniques 
into a common digital code makes the arts radically interchangeable--a 
particular technique or medium no longer distinguishes one art from the 
other because hypermedia programs designed to replicate those 
techniques all use the same digital template. Second, the common 
digital code opens "levels of symbolic transformation, and the work and 
information that went with them, to people hitherto shut out from this 
world." (39) That is, to paint, compose, or perform, one need not devote 
a life to practicing techniques; instead, one devotes time to manipulating 
formatted techniques in a hypermedia program.
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According to John Palattella Lanham praises this digitization of the arts 
because “ it forces an answer to the problem of multiculturalism that he 
thinks has recently beset humanities departments: how to educate the 
first-generation Americans and non-native speakers of English who now 
comprise the majority of the student population in the arts in many 
universities” (par. 36). Lanham thinks that digitization enables one to 
teach the humanities to an economically and culturally diverse student 
population because it provides a common, democratic language and 
thought process (Par. 36). He describes how interactive CD-programs 
enable students in art history classes to paint like Matisse in order to 
learn about art, or students in music theory classes to compose like 
Mozart or Bach in order to learn about symphonies. "Can you 
democratize genius?", an imaginary interlocutor asks Lanham in his 
book's last chapter. Lanham responds, "No, but I think you can 
democratize music-making" (60). How one can claim that he can 
democratize music making? What kind of a democracy is this?
Electronic hypertext and contemporary discussions of critical 
theory, particularly those of the poststructralists, display 
many points of convergence, but one point one which they 
differ is tone. Whereas most writings on theory, with the 
notable exception of Derrida, are models of scholarly 
solemnity, records of disillusionment and brave sacrifice of 
humanistic positions, writers on hypertext are downright 
celebratory. Whereas terms like d e a t h ,  v a n i s h ,  l o s s  and
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expressions of depletion and impoverishment color critical 
theory, the vocabulary of the freedom, energy, and 
empowerment marks writings on hypertextuality. (Landow,
1992:87)
‘Empowerment’, ‘energy’ and 'freedom' are all terminologies of liberal 
democracy that hypertext theorists borrow to develop their digital 
democracy (which is nothing more than liberalism). At this point I shall 
pass to analyze which liberal ideals underlie these claims of digital 
democracy since to read hypertext as a smooth, unified object with a 
liberal democratic ideology (that’s what these hypertext theorists do) 
says more about the political composition of the critics concerned than it 
does about hypertext. In the previous chapter I referred to Richard 
Rorty’s ideas criticizing the two readings of Derrida in the United 
States. However, if one asks why these hypertext theorists talk about a 
digital democracy, the answer again underlies Rorty’s arguments 
because he shares the same liberal democratic ideals with hypertext 
theorists.
3.2 Rorty’s Derrida and Democracy
Rorty is known in the United States for his books on Derrida and where he 
displays the similarities he finds between pragmatism and deconstruction. 
He puts himself as a follower of Dewey and Wittgenstein and develops a
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liberal-pragmatism upon their ideas. Thus, his books on Derrida are a 
somehow a liberal democratic approach to deconstruction.
Rorty sees Derrida as sharing the same ‘utopian’ rules hopes with Dewey 
but not showing any clear or direct way to the realization of this hope. Rorty 
divides philosophers rather ‘crudely’ into two groups; public liberals and 
private ironists. The first group consisting of philosophers, namely Mill, 
Dewey and Rawls, as he proposes, produce works that “fulfil primarily public 
purposes" (16). The second group involving Derrida, Heiddegger, and 
Nietzsche who are problematizing Western Metaphysics which in result 
produces “private satisfactions to people who are deeply involved with 
philosophy (therefore necessarily, with metaphysics) but not as politically 
consequential, except in a very indirect and long-term way” (ibid.).
So Rorty thinks of Derrida ‘at his best’ in his works like ‘Envois’ section of 
La Carte Postale where he works in his “private relationships to his two 
grandfathers, Freud and Heiddegger’’ (ibid.). Then, Rorty takes a step 
forward in his categorization by dividing Derrida’s works into two main 
chronological periods. For him, Derrida's earlier works like Of Grammatology 
are “ less idiosyncratic and more strictly philosophical" where Derrida works 
out his private relationships to figures that meant most to him. Rorty prefers 
Derrida’s later works like ’Envois’ and ‘Circonfession’ because they seem to 
him “more vivid and forceful forms of self-creation" (17)
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Because I read my favorite Derridean texts this way, I have 
trouble with the specifically Levinasian strains in his thought. In 
particular I am unable to connect Levinas's pathos of infinite with 
ethics or politics. I see ethics and politics - real politics as 
opposed to cultural politics - as a matter of reaching 
accommodation between competing interests, and as something 
to be deliberated about in banal, familiar terms - terms which do 
not need philosophical dissection and do not have philosophical 
presuppositions. (17)
Rorty concludes his speech saying that he sees ‘romantic and utopian hopes’ 
in Derrida’s Politics of Friendship which contribute to Derrida’s 'private self- 
fashioning' thus texts like Politics of Friendship can have no contributions to 
political thought. Politics, as Rorty sees it “is a matter of pragmatic, short­
term reforms and compromises - compromises which must, in democratic 
society, be proposed and defended in terms of much less esoteric than those 
in which we overcome the metaphysics of presence" (17)
When Derrida talks about deconstruction as prophetic of the 
‘democracy to come’, he seems to me expressing the same 
utopian social hope as was felt by these earlier dreamers. (Rorty 
16)
Rorty grounds all his categorizations on the basis of the opposition public 
and private. For him public and private are two domains that are 
theoretically impossible to reconcile. “The private is defined by Rorty as
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being concerned with idiosyncratic projects of self-overcoming, with self­
creation and the pursuit of autonomy. The public is defined as being 
concerned with those activities having to do with the suffering of other 
human beings, with attempt to minimize cruelty and work for social justice" 
(Rorty cited in Critchley 21). To confuse the field of application for each of 
these vocabularies would be to engage in a form of category mistake; first, 
in the sense, that to judge the public by standards of private and second, to 
judge the private by the standards of the public.
Therefore, for Rorty, Derrida can only be understood as a private thinker 
whose work has no public utility and no interesting political or ethical 
consequences. “Concealed in this claim is...a normative belief to the effect 
that Derrida should not be considered as a public thinker. The reason for 
this is that Rorty believes if Derrida's works were extended into the public 
realm, then this would produce either useless, pernicious or possibly even 
dangerous ethical and political consequences" (Critchley 20). Thus, in a 
way, Rorty confines deconstruction to the domain of the private. The 
consequence of Rorty’s thesis is that Derrida’s work has no ethical, political 
or public significance in so far as it has given up on the attempt to reconcile 
theoretically the public and the private. Unless this happens Rorty will 
consider Derrida as having done with "the history of philosophy what Proust 
did for his life study” (Rorty cited in Critchley 30), thus belonging to the
62
realm of literature rather than philosophy as for Rorty ‘beneficial’ philosophy 
has to deal with the public realm.
For Rorty, deconstruction is not (quasi)-transcendental 
philosophy, but must be understood as part of a tradition of 
philosophy as world-disclosure, a tradition that includes Plato,
Hegel and Heiddegger, where are all vocabularies of self- and 
world-description are challenged, redescribed and replaced by 
new vocabularies. Thus, the crucial distinction to draw is that 
between an argumentative form of language which addresses the 
problems of social justice - what I called the ‘public’ - and a non- 
argumentative, often oracular, form of language that is world- 
disclosive and concerned with the quest for individual autonomy - 
what we called the ‘private’. (Cricthley 29)
It is quite clear that underlying Rorty’s distinction between public and 
private, there is the strict separation of theory and practice. A philosophy, 
therefore a theory is not beneficial unless it can be utilized by the public 
realm. Philosophy has to be prepositional to derive certain visible criteria to 
‘apply’ for the sake of growth in common wealth. If not, then, it will be an 
activity of self-problematization to “save for weekends“ (Rorty 44).
Ernest Laclau asks a very simple question to Rorty: How is the very
distinction between the public and the private actually established? Laclau
notes that this distinction itself becomes problematic and reveals itself as
what it actually is: “just an ideal-typical attempt at stabilizing an essentially
unstable frontier which is constantly trespassed and overflown by movement
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from its two sides" and adds that “only in an tidy rationalistic world can the 
demands of self-creation and those of solidarity be so neatly differentiated 
as Rorty wants them to be” (Laclau 51)
Apart from Laclau, Simon Critchley also asks another question to Rorty and 
himself: Is Derrida a private ironist? Grounding his discussion on Rorty’s 
distinction, Critchley says that this distinction paves the way to understand 
Derrida, in the sense that, once this distinction is put forward one must also 
recognize the limits of public and private are undecidable. Then, it turns out 
to be Rorty, himself, is the ‘utopian’ in the sense that he tries to separate 
what is inseparable. Critchley draws our attention to the circumstances 
under which his utopia can be achieved. ‘‘Rorty’s utopia is the vision of a 
society of liberal ironists, and progress towards such a utopia will be 
achieved by the universalization of liberal society” (Critchley 23). In fact in 
his response to Simon Critchley, Rorty quite openly describes his utopia:
As I see contemporary politics, we do not need what Critchley 
calls ‘a critique of liberal society’. We just need more liberal 
societies, and more liberal laws in force within each such society.
I see European philosophical thought as still dominated by the 
Marxist notion of I d e o l o g i e k r i t i k ,  and by the romantic notion of 
the philosopher as the person who penetrates behind 
appearances of present social institutions to the reality. I distrust 
both notions.
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My principle reason for distrusting them is a political guess about 
which are the most efficient casual mechanism for fruitful 
institutional change. My suspicion of metaphysics and of the 
whole contrast between Appearance and Reality, is, politically 
speaking, just an optional extra. As somebody trained in 
philosophy I get my most romantic kicks out of metaphysics­
bashing. As a citizen of democratic state, I do not think that 
metaphysics-bashing is - except in the very long term - of much 
use. (45-6)
Isn't this the same utopia of digital democracy that hypertext theorists 
develop and which would be only possible through the digitization of 
arts? The main argument in Rorty is that public and private, therefore 
theory and practice should be clearly distinguished from each other. 
Thus he develops a utilitarian view of philosophy, a philosophy which 
would only be valuable through applicability. In this way Rorty gives a 
hand to the hypertext theorists in constructing their hypertext laboratory 
where they ‘test’ and determine the feasibility of philosophies.
3.3 Liberalist-hypertextual ideals
When Rorty talks about philosophy, especially deconstruction as
allowing for the blurring of the boundaries between philosophy and
literature, he confines deconstruction in the field of literature. He clearly
distinguishes the profession of politics and the ‘profession’ of philosophy
claiming that many of philosophies have no public utility, and are
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therefore useless. Then, what hypertext theorists try to achieve in 
applying Derrida's ideas, is the search of a utility for deconstruction. 
However, in the end it turns out that which can have public and ethical 
consequences is hypertext, not philosophy, since philosophers are still 
engaged within the same limitations of print culture.
Liberal democracy involves the process of apolitization. We see the 
applications of this process both in Rorty's arguments and the claims of 
hypertext theorists. On one hand Rorty excludes deconstruction from 
the ‘profession’ of politics by saying that “deconstruction is too marginal 
for politics” (Rorty 71), and situates Derrida in the ‘profession’ of self- 
problematizing philosophy. On the other hand, hypertext theorists 
accept Derrida as providing neutral, objective methods to apply in any 
field, which is, in their case, hypertext.
The difficulty in both of these arguments is that they both keep the strict 
distinction of theory and practice. In the case of Rorty this distinction is 
put forward in the form of the distinction between public and private and 
for hypertext theorists the distinction is between Derridean theory and 
its application, hypertext. Both carry this distinction to the field of 
democracy through the universalization of liberalist ideals. While 
hypertext theorists call for a more democratic space through hypertext, 
Rorty says that the only thing we need is more liberal countries and
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more liberal laws in force within each such society. Thus, to employ 
deconstruction in order to develop a fantasy of digital democracy has 
two difficulties: to read deconstruction as a neutral theory as having no 
political and ethical consequences and to read hypertext as a smooth, 
unified object free from any prior relation to politics.
I shall make the first point explicitly referring to Derrida's concepts of 
undecidability and justice upon which we can talk about the ‘politics of 
deconstruction’. As mentioned above Simon Critchley and Ernest 
Laclau, against the distinction of Rorty, both mention that the limits of 
the public and private are undecidable. Similarly when Rorty talks about 
the perfection of liberal ideals, liberal laws and therefore liberal justice, 
Critchley mentions the undecidability of justice according to Derrida. As 
relation to this very undecidability Critchley quotes Derrida saying that 
“justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not 
deconstructable. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing 
exists. Deconstruction is justice” (34). However, it is important to note 
that this conception of justice “does not arise in some intellectual 
intuition or theoretical deduction” . Rather, for Derrida, it is an 
experience of that “which we are not able to experience, which is 
qualified as ‘the mystical’, ‘the impossible' or ‘aporia’. In Derrida's more 
habitual vocabulary, justice is an experience of ‘the undecidable’ (34).
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The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension 
between two decisions, it is the experience of that which, 
though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable 
and the rule, is still obliged - it is of obligation that we must 
speak - to give itself up to the impossible decision, while 
taking account of laws and rules. A decision that did not go 
through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free 
decision, it would only be the programmable application or 
unfolding of a calculable progress. (Derrida cited in Laclau 
53)
Since politics is the realnn of decision, Critchley argues, of the 
organization and administration of the public realm, of the institution of 
law and policy “ the central aporia of deconstruction - an aporia that 
must not be avoided if any responsible political activity is to be 
undertaken - concerns the nature of this passage from undecidability to 
the decision, from the ethical ‘experience’ of justice to political action, 
to what we might call the moment of judgement" (Critchley 35).
For Derrida, no political form can or should attempt to 
embody justice, and the undecidability of justice must always 
lie outside the public realm, guiding, criticizing and 
deconstructing that realm, but never being instantiated within 
it. From a deconstructive perspective, the greatest danger in 
politics is the threat of totalitarianism, or what Jean-Luc 
Nancy calls ‘ immanentism’, in all its most recent and 
terrifying disguises: neo-fascism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, 
theocracy. (Critchley 35)
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Then justice beconnes the inexperiencable aporia, that no particular 
person, system, state, community or territory could be said to embody. 
"One might say that the ‘experience’ of justice is that of an absolute 
alterity or transcendence that guides politics without being fully present 
in the public realm" (Critchley 36).
It is now asked what political form best maintains this dis­
embodiment of justice, then I take it that Derrida’s response 
would be d e m o c r a c y :  not a democracy that claims to 
instantiate justice here and now, not an apologetics for 
actually existing liberal democracy (but neither a dismissal of 
the latter), but a democracy guided by the f u t u r a l  or 
p r o j e c t i v e  transcendence of justice - what Derrida calls u n e  
d e m o k r a t i e  a v e n i r .  (Critchley 36)
Returning to our earlier argument of the difficulties in hypertextual 
claim, the second point is the reading of hypertext as a smooth, unified 
object, free from any political position and, developing an understanding 
of a new democracy through it when "all technological developments are 
overcoded by images of consumption and production” (Palattella par. 
12).
Capitalism has its own desires, and these desires are often 
coextensive with hypertext as it unfolds before us. Indeed, 
this is actually one of capitalism’s desires; it wants to be 
immanent to everything we do, it wants to move our trigger-
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happy finger as it runs the mouse across those baubles and 
bright links (ibid.)
In this sense there is no need search for a ‘perfect match’ between 
Derrida's theory and hypertext in order to construct a digital, liberal 
democracy since hypertext is always already included in the capitalist 
mechanisms. The structuation of internet technologies with the 
emphasis on e-business, e-commerce and other technologies dominated 
by capitalism, are the points where this ‘invisible hand’ becomes the 
most obvious one.
‘Let’s not ask is hypertext like this thing/that thing/a Derridean 
network/a rhizome/liberatory/a Barthesian text/a poststructuralist 
whatever. Let’s not overcode, play with cookie-cutters, make the edges 
neat” (Palattella 3). Better to ask, is it possible to resist this ‘nightmare 
regime of calculable subjectivity’ (Dienst 41)?
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that one has to ask other questions, in spite of all these
negotiations that I have tried to discuss until now. In contrast to
undertaking hypertext theories in themselves which are striving to
maintain the rules, to impose the measure and to fix a goal, the
resistance is a movement that escapes all aims and resolutions. 
Resisting to the universal logic of the conception of hypertext is yet to 
be suggested. At this point, such a resistance questions the logic of this 
universalization of the concepts of art, science and philosophy as they 
were represented by hypertext theorists as the default part of the 
society's demand for progress. Thus so far, the inherent structure of all 
these difficulties, I think, is dependent upon the opinion that through the 
emerging technology we have come up with something unfathomable, 
something that has to be deciphered. This general approach to 
technology has another proposition that we should try to understand 
what is being developed; and consequently philosophy must follow the 
practical influences, art should be able to use these new tools of 
creation, and science should take one step further in the process (thus 
following its own steps). And more generally, to follow praising emerging 
technologies as being smooth-unified, and defining the good and bad
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only in terms of its beneficent or mal-use, would be a naïve question 
according to Ulus Baker:
What I am trying to say in short is, are we going to accept 
totally and then complain about everything we are faced with; 
all these information highways, nanotechnologies, or all the 
projects that genetic engineers will work out; or are we going 
to put forth a multi-resistance over against 'single-oriented 
consensus' in order to expand until its 'inside' and 'limits'.
(par. 10) [my trans.]
From the point of view of Baker, it seems difficult to deny a relation 
between an anxiety towards the flow of progressive technologies and a 
reaction which is uncertain at the moment of its formation. Involved in 
society's habits in the from of a passive synthesis, one could 
differentiate two reactions: a complete denial or a total acceptance. 
However, are not denial and acceptance here the same precondition of 
the functioning of this flow without resisting it? Isn't it the search for a 
ground to apply questions in binary oppositions such as true-and-false, 
good-and-bad dichotomies? Moreover, would not to apply such a 
grounding critique serve only to justify traditional ways of thinking?
This encounter between progress and its anxiety is never new, when we 
look to the history of art. If it is true that History understood as such are 
the jumps from one state to other, then the identification of the Baroque 
art with the knowing of the world. Modern art with industrial revolution,
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Postmodern art with the post-capitalist society would be definite. 
However, the identification of the artist with the period he lives may still 
remain indefinite. For example, in the case of the modern, this indefinite 
and suspended relationship between an acceptance of the modern as ail 
there is, and hints at what lies hidden within it, does not make the 
description of the Baudelairean flaneur into an all-accepting of the modern, 
although he seems to be giving himself to the fleeting moment. It does, 
however, signal an attempt to come to terms with an experience which is 
both a threat and a challenge.
For Walter Benjamin, the history is a feature yet to be discussed 
implying that the resistance can be found towards an understanding of 
time. In Theses on the Philosophy of History, Benjamin holds a 
discussion on a painting by Klee. ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel 
looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are 
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned 
toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of 
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole 
what has been smashed.
"But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in 
his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer 
close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future
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to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before 
him grows skyward. T h i s  s t o r m  i s  w h a t  w e  c a l l  p r o g r e s s . "  
(1995)
This statement clarifies two things:
Firstly, Benjamin states that if one wants to understand any 
advancement through human evolution the past has to be included and if 
one (ad)ventures to include, one sees it is full of suffering. Benjamin's 
strong proposal is this opposition: If you are trying to understand 
anything involving progress you have to brush the past's hairs in the 
opposite direction. "We must attain to a conception of history that is in 
keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task 
to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our 
position in the struggle against Fascism." Therefore to resist to what is 
being proposed by the developing technologies defined as being neuter, 
as being independent of a past which is marked by its wars and 
suffering, as being an innocent tool, would be worthy according to 
Benjamin. A real state of emergency, thus, is the resistance to the storm 
that the 'angel' is caught up, whether it questions fascism or the liberal 
discourse of contemporary theories of hypertext.
The Second point that this painting by Klee implies is that it points out to 
the possibility of another reading: for the angel is caught up in the
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storm, the storm does not remain unaffected from being interrupted. To 
put in Derridean words, the storm holds the possibility of resistanoe in 
itself.
After this point, what I propose is that we need a different reading of 
hypertext than these theorists who consider hypertext as a smooth, 
unified object. I would suggest that hypertext, as one of the media of 
telecommunication technologies, holds the interruptive forces in itself. 
Such an interruptive reading of hypertext is, according to Geoffrey 
Bennington, would be interesting in Derridean sense, too. In regard to 
discussion of the Internet, Bennington states that:
There is a double logic here we might want to explore, 
whereby the (in principle democratic) increase in 
'communicability' made possible by electronic communication 
leads to a commensurate increase in 'contaminability' of all 
sorts, so that advances in communication seem not to lead in 
any straightforward way to transparency or clarity, still less 
to equality, but quite possibly to the opposite. Perhaps 
something about information technology made it possible for 
Derrida to formulate things about communication and 
contamination that turn out to have been around since Plato 
and that in a sense philosophy exists to control, (par. 4)
If the communication can not be thought without contamination this is a 
deconstructionist resistance. Perhaps these are the topics that would 
be interesting to explore for Derrida, for the reason that they reveal not
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the 'encyclopedic' but the 'interruptive' forces inherent to the 
technological forces. So that instead of claiming a theory that 
hypertextuality somehow realized the supposed aims of deconstruction 
(which is mistaken according to Bennington) it should be stated that, 
deconstruction does not have aims in any standard sense, and even on 
a interpretation that thought it did have aims (to bring about something 
called 'textuality', or some such thing), hypertext could not be said to 
realize those aims. Hypertext exploits some features of textuality that 
traditional forms of writing tend to conceal 'a degree of non-linearity' or 
even repress 'the order of the Book', but these features do not 
automatically make it the deconstructionist's dream come true. Indeed, 
hypertexts can just as well be presented as a fulfillment of a 
metaphysical view of writing driven by the Idea of an absolutely 
accessible Encyclopedia of all knowledge.
As Bennington states, in 'Two words for Joyce', Derrida suggests that 
Joyce's text is already more powerful in its hypertextual capacities (he 
doesn't use the term, but that's what it's about) than any super­
computer. I think, he means that hypertext is not a simple chronological 
progress of invention, thus, in that sense, a (real) hypertext is a sort of 
image of textuality rather than a realization of it.
In a discussion about deconstruction Derrida states that, with regard to 
philosophical hegemony, the deconstructive force is a gesture that consists
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of finding, or seeking, whatever in the work represents a resistance to 
philosophical authority. This, Derrida claims, is important to any discourse, 
whether it be literary, philosophical or political, (par. 10)
Derrida emphasizes the fact that deconstruction is not that which comes to 
the text, but rather that there is text as soon as deconstruction is engaged: 
either the use of 'text' in hypertext, nor the employment of deconstruction to 
hypertext theories could succeed. Derrida emphasizes the fact that, since 
deconstruction begins with the deconstruction of logocentrism, to confine it 
to linguistic foundations would be most suspect. Deconstruction is not that 
which destroys the conventional forms of text, but rather that which affirms 
a certain condition of a construction of a text through deconstruction in 
which the foundations themselves have been deconstructed. As Derrida 
notes: 'If the foundations are assured, there is no construction; neither is 
there any invention... Thus deconstruction is the condition of construction, of 
true invention, of a real affirmation that holds something together, that 
constructs' (1987:27).
So that deconstruction is not a mere criticism but through interruption of 
general economy of texts it creates. This interruptive force elemental to the 
technology -thus in our case general economy of texts as hypertext- can be 
best understood in terms of Derrida's conception of the postal regime in 
contrast to Rorty's understanding of it. Derrida, evokes the postcard as a 
metaphor for a culture which is 'cast as an immense number of postal
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transmissions, each stamped by authorities and tradition" (1987:296), from 
this set the object of the postcard is divided not only within its text-image 
but also the exchange is deferred.
It is clear that he postcard in Derrida's The Post Card is evoked as that 
which refers to the general economy of texts. The postcard bears many 
duties at once: it must not only carry its message and image, but also has 
the obligation of having a sufficient address, a legible signature, and a tax or 
investment paid to the delivery apparatus. The postcard is therefore always 
responsible along with its senders and receivers to the system that sends it. 
The postcard is always in danger of having its transmission interrupted, or its 
message smeared. Insofar as it submits itself to these necessary conditions, 
the postcard is a technology or communication in Derrida's sense. As Dienst 
writes: 'Both postcards remind us of the prices we pay (to culture, to the 
state, to capitalism) for our images and messages' (297), as we always pay 
for the technology in terms of suffering as Benjamin stated.
A reading of postcard can be stated as some way which hinges on the 
question of hypertext as a general economy of culture: the information 
technologies reminds us that communication is always sent, emitted, 
diffused, circulated. The postcard, in this sense, figures the process of 
transmission rather than inscription, sending rather than writing. Here I 
would suggest that postcard has the capability to show how a Derridean 
writing is always already a sending in the sense of a communication however
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interrupted and interrupting. This makes clear that there is not a simple 
'sending' or 'receiving' the message or any smooth understanding of the texts 
and images to be composed in an hypertext, rather there is a resistance in 
the medium itself as the postcard can not arrive without carrying the 
possibility of the non-arrival along with it.
This possibility deriving from an impossibility can be said to correspond to a 
resistance only as an art form, towards technology and its problematization 
of hypertext or any other instance, for art is the only way to fulfil such a 
demand of organizing such a resistance,. As we can repeat Klee's statement, 
art is 'waiting for a community which would never arrive'.
' Landow employs this term to disparage the physical form of the book 




Baker, Ulus. İnternette Sanat Mümkün mü?. Online. Internet. March 2000 
Available through: http://aries.gisam.nnetu.edu.tr
Barthes, Roland. S /Z : An Essay, trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1974.
Benjamin, Walter. Estetize Edilmiş Yaşam. DER Yayınları, 1995
Bennington, Geoffrey. Seulemonde Conversation with Geoffrey Bennington. 
Online. Internet.
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space: The Computer. Hypertext and the History 
of Writing. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.
Bush, Vannevar. " As We May Think." in Computer-Supported Cooperative 
Work: A Book of Readings, ed. Irene Greif. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann 
Publishers Inc., 1988. pp. 17-34.
80
Critchley, Simon 'Deconstruction and Pragmatism - Is Derrida a Private Ironist 
or a Public Liberal?' in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe, 
Nev\/ York: Routledge, 1996
Culler, Jonathan. On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism. 
London: Routledge, 1983.
Delany & G.P. Landow, eds.. Hypermedia and literary studies. 81 -104. 
Cambridge: MIT Press,1991
Derrida, Jacques. Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatoloqy. Trans. G. C. Spivak. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1976.
Derrida, Jacques. The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques 'Signature, Event, Context' in Limited Inc., trans. Samuel 
Weber and Jeffrey Mehiman.Northwestern University Press, 1988.
Derrida, Jacques, Glas. University of Nebraska Press, 1987.
81
Derrida, Jacques. Positions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981
Dyck, Paul. Hypertext and Critical Theory. Online. Internet
Grusin, Richard A. "What is an Electronic Author? Theory and the 
Technological Fallacy" in Configurations 3. pp. 469-83.
Johnson-Eilola, Johndan. "Control and the Cyborg: Writing and Being 
Written in Hypertext" in Journal of Advanced Composition. 13:2. pp. 381- 
99, 1993
Laclau, Ernesto 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism,Hegemony' in Deconstruction 
and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe, New York: Routledge, , 1996
Landow, George P. "What's a Critic to Do?: Critical Theory in the Age of 
Hypertext." Hvper/Text/Theorv. ed. George P. Landow. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkin's University Press, 1994.
Landow, George P. Hypertext: The convergence of contemporary critical 
theory and technology. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992.
82
Lanham, Richard A. The Electronic Word: Democracy. Technology and the Arts. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
McHoul, Alec & Roe, Phil. Hypertext and Reading Cognition. Online.
Internet
McKnight, Cliff, John Richardson and Andrew Dillon. "The authoring of 
hypertext documents." In: R. McAleese, ed.. Hypertext: Theory into 
practice. 138-147. Oxford: Intellect Books, 1989
Palattella, John. "Formatting Patrimony: the Rhetoric of Hypertext." 
Afterimage. June, 1995.
Rorty, Richard 'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism' in 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe, New York: Routledge,
, 1996
Rosenberg, Martin "Physics and Hypertext: Liberation and Complicity in Art 
and Pedagogy." Hvper/Text/Theory. ed. George P. Landow. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkin's University Press, 1994. 1-48.
Shneiderman, Ben and Greg Kearsley. Hypertext hands-on: An introduction 
to a new way of organising and accessing information. Reading: Addison- 
Wesley, 1989.
83
Wheeler, Katleen M. Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction. 
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.
84
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barnet, Belinda. Reconfiguring Hypertext as a Machine: Capitalism, 
Periodic Tables and a Mad Optometrist. Online. Internet.
Barthes, Roland. "From Work to Text", in Imaqe-music-text. 155-164. trans. 
S. Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.
Benjamin, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", 
in Illuminations. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.
Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. New York/London: Harvester, 
1982.
Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference. Trans. A. Bass. London: 
Routledge, 1978.
Derrida, Jacques. “Summary of Impromptu Remarks." Ed. C. Davidson. 
Anyone. 1991.
Heim, Michael. The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993.
85
Joyce, Michael. Of Two Minds: Hypertext. Pedagogy and Poetics. The 
University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Nelson, Theodor Holm. Literary Machines. Mindful Press: Sausalito, 1981
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge/New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989
Rorty, Richard. "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality", in: On Human 
Rights The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, eds. Stephen Shute and Susan 
Hurley, New York, Basic Books, pp. I l l  -134, 1993.
Rorty, Richard. "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy", in 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 49, no. 194, pp. 437-459,1995
Slatin, John. "Reading hypertext: Order and Coherence in a New Medium, 
in, P. Delany and G.P. Landow, eds.. Hypermedia and literary studies. 153- 
169. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991
86
Snyder, liana. Hypertext: The Electronic Labyrinth. Melbourne Uniyersity Press, 
1996.
87
